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“Islamization of the Occident” 
Fear of Islam as a Mobilizing Force of the  
European New Right 
 




Recent research has investigated the emotional underpinnings of support for populist New Right parties 
and movements. Some of these works focus on the supply-side of New Right support, emphasizing 
specific political styles and discourses, whereas others emphasize the demand-side, highlighting cultural, 
economic, and emotional factors. Lacking from this research, in particular for the European context, is 
an understanding of how supporters of the New Right experience and make sense of pertinent cleavages 
with regards to emotions. The present study sets out to acquire a more detailed understanding of the 
emotional narratives and experiences of supporters of New Right parties and movements, in particular 
with regard to fear and religious cleavages. Using group interviews with supporters of New Right parties 
and movements in Germany, we show that narratives involving fear pertain to the idea of a valued 
collective “We” that consists of political and cultural elements and serves as a reference point to collec-
tive identity and an antidote to existential insecurities. Further, this collective “We” is perceived to be 
threatened by cultural differences and changing majority-minority relations with respect to five domains 
of social life: demography, the liberal democratic order, public majority culture, security, and welfare. 
 
1. Introduction   
Since the increase in refugee migration to Europe in 2015, challenges related to flight, 
migration, and social integration have become most pressing political issues. But al-
ready before 2015, these challenges have been a breeding ground for the success of 
new (radical, populist) right parties across Europe, as countless studies have shown 
(e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008). This is evident, for example, in the success of the “Alternative 
for Deutschland” (AfD) in Germany, the “Front National” in France, or the “Dansk 
Folkeparti” in Denmark, all of which have put issues of migration and social integra-
tion on their agendas. In order to understand the success of these parties and related 
social movements, many have argued that above and beyond economic and cultural 
grievances, specific emotions motivate political support and drive success of the New 
Right.  
Although the emotions supposed to motivate support for the New Right are diverse 
and include feelings of déclassement, hate, and ressentiment, fear stands out as a par-
ticularly relevant emotion. Looking at the German case of the AfD and related voter 
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alliances, but also at other movements and parties across Europe, fear in the discourse 
of the New Right is frequently associated with concerns over culture, status, and em-
ployment. Moreover, religion as an object of fear is particularly salient in this discourse. 
Supporters of the New Right are said to be concerned about the threat of an “Islamiza-
tion” of society. Paradigmatic examples are the protest group Pegida (Patriotic Euro-
peans against the Islamization of the Occident) in Germany and the SIOE (Stop Islam-
ization of Europe) movement in other countries. Religion, and in particular Islam, here 
becomes a key reference not only for fear, but for a cluster of emotions including anx-
iety, hate, and resentment. Religion is intimately connected to cleavages surrounding 
transnational migration from Near and Middle Eastern countries while at the same time 
Christianity has been on the decline as a source of cohesion in many European coun-
tries for decades (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). 
Research has mainly begun to investigate the supply side of this emotional dimen-
sion of support for the New Right, asking how political parties and social movements 
articulate, construct, and address the emotions of their supporters and the general pub-
lic (e.g., Breeze, 2019; Ekström et al., 2018; Block & Negrine, 2017). The most com-
prehensive treatment of fear, in this respect, has been provided by Wodak (2015), who 
investigated the “politics of fear” in the New Right discourse. In contrast, still little is 
known about the emotions of supporters of New Right parties and movements. 
Hochschild’s (2016) study of tea party supporters in Louisiana, USA, is a notable ex-
ception, as is Cramer’s (2016) work on resentment in rural Wisconsin, USA. Both em-
phasize emotional processes that are also frequently mentioned in continental debates, 
in particular hate, anger, and resentment towards cultural and political elites, immi-
grants, and minorities (see Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). None of these, however, 
focus specifically on fear in conjunction with religion. Hence, the emotional landscape 
of right-wing support has mainly remained a matter of public debate, in particular in 
the European context, and thus of speculation and discursive attributions.  
The present study sets out to acquire a more detailed understanding of the emo-
tional narratives and experiences of supporters of New Right parties and movements, 
in particular with regard to fear. Instead of looking at political issues and cleavages 
very generally, we focus on religion as one of the most prominent areas of political 
contestation in contemporary Western societies. We also capitalize on a specific coun-
try case, namely Germany, to investigate fear amongst the New Right. This is because 
Germany recently has witnessed steep success rates of New Right parties in state and 
federal elections and seen the advent of several social movements on the New Right. 
At the same time, Germany is an interesting case because Christianity, in particular 
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Protestantism and Catholicism, is a de-facto state religion, although religion and the 
state are constitutionally separated. This suggests a particularly pronounced and emo-
tionally charged line of cleavage and contestation.  
In the remainder of this article, we first review research on the relevance of emo-
tions for the success of the New Right, with an emphasis on cleavages concerning 
religion and fear as a particularly salient emotion. We then outline our research design 
and describe our methodological approach as well as the specific methods we used. 
We then present the results of our analysis, summarize our findings and offer some 
concluding remarks. 
2. The New Right as a Social Movement 
Political resistance sometimes develops eruptively, affects broad sections of society, 
and can bring down regimes overnight. But sometimes it is also the result of the ongo-
ing political mobilization of social movements. Such movements typically consist of 
networks of different initiatives, agents, organizations and parties that seek to bring 
about, halt, or even reverse social change on the basis of a common concern. Their 
success depends on a number of internal and external factors, such as the availability 
of material and organizational resources, the current political situation, and the impact 
of symbols, language, and emotions (Jasper, 2011). These latter factors are often con-
sidered the basis for social movement cohesion and the emergence of collective action 
(Daphi & Rucht, 2011). In particular, they are also the building blocks of activating 
and resonant narratives through which a critical mass of supporters can be mobilized.  
Social movements produce these narratives by providing strategically elaborated 
opportunities for making sense of the (political) world and to channel widespread feel-
ings and perceptions into a common emotional narrative (e.g., Nepstad & Smith, 2001). 
To this end, activists frame issues and cleavages in terms of a clearly defined social 
problem and unambiguously identify perpetrators and culprits who are responsible for 
the respective grievances and emotions on which a movement capitalizes, at the same 
time calling for countermeasures (Benford & Snow, 2000). As narratives that are in-
tended to move people toward collective resistance, they are often metaphorically 
dense and emotionally charged, aiming at various injustices and opponents that need 
to be challenged.  
Social movements of the New Right can be described by a broad range of criteria. 
Here, we focus on their right-wing ideological core, a historically far-reaching nation-
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alist narrative, and their – often populist – rhetoric and style. The ideological core usu-
ally includes the idea of the existence of a true “people” or a “nation” defined in ethnic 
terms, which is pitched against different outgroups, typically political elites and mi-
norities (Mudde, 2004). These typically “thin-centered” ideologies (Mudde & Kalt-
wasser, 2017) tend to include an agonal moment between the familiar, collective self 
and the Other, whose relationship is characterized by processes of demarcation and 
boundary making (Wimmer, 2013).  
Even though questions of belonging and solidarity vary amongst New Right ideo-
logies, they largely concur in their general themes and propagated actions which in-
form their politics of differentiation and exclusion: Their main concern is with a na-
tional community and its national sovereignty, the (“natural”) order of the sexes, and, 
in particular, the defense against what is perceived as culturally or socially alien. This 
is evident in the notion of a supposedly “true” people that paves the way for perceptions 
and evaluations of the Other as being of lower worth. This ideology is usually supple-
mented by a characteristic political style and rhetoric (Moffitt, 2016) which informs 
fundamental patterns of feeling, perception, and valuation with clearly identifiable 
emotion repertoires (Röttger-Rössler et al., 2019; Reddy, 2001; Wodak, 2015). Na-
tional Socialism, for example, was characterized by nationalist and racist mobilization 
rooted in racist and anti-Semitic narratives of a “healthy national body” that is to be 
protected from “harm” and “injury”. This narrative not only constructed specific values 
and ideas, but at the same time portrayed these as being threatened by outgroups. Sim-
ilar narratives can be found amongst the New Right: religion, in particular Christianity, 
is constructed as an important reference of the collective social body whereas the reli-
gious other – primarily Islam – is linked to and imbued with negative emotion.  
Despite a general lack of research looking into the role of religion in populist prac-
tices of boundary-making, some recent scholarship has shown that religion is instru-
mental in establishing symbolic boundaries through populist rhetoric (see deHanas & 
Shterin, 2018, 2019; Marzouki, McDonnell, & Roy, 2016; Zúquete, 2017, for over-
views). Two studies are particularly noteworthy in this respect: Roy’s (2016) research 
on the role of religion in the Front National in France and Brubaker’s (2017) compar-
ative study of European populist movements. DeHanas and Shterin (2018) summarize 
their findings, stating that the link between religion and populism is primarily “identi-
tarian and negative”, focusing on distinctions between the “civilized” Western world 
and “barbaric” Muslims (p. 178). According to Roy and Brubaker, populists tend to 
reinvent a Christian past that is threatened by immigration from predominantly Muslim 
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countries. In their narrative, “the people” need to be saved by expelling Muslims. Alt-
hough these works already hint at the emotional qualities and repercussion of this dis-
course, dedicated analyses of emotions, and particularly of fear, are scarce. Using some 
examples from German and Austrian populist parties, Palaver (2019) argues that the 
populist discourse on religion is specifically geared towards eliciting fear amongst its 
audience.  
Given these indications of the relevance of fear with regard to the New Right’s 
perspective on religion, it is surprising that most studies tend to focus on discourse and 
rhetoric. What has received far less attention is how supporters of the New Right actu-
ally make sense of the role of religion in everyday life and regarding pertinent political 
cleavages in particular. How do they experience religion in this discourse? Is fear ac-
tually a salient emotion in this context? What emotional narratives do supporters artic-
ulate with respect to religion? What, specifically, are the sources and justifications of 
individual and collective fear? To answer these questions, we conducted a number of 
group interviews with supporters of the New Right. In the following sections, we out-
line the methods we used for this study and presents he results of our analyses.  
3. Methods 
To acquire a better understanding of how emotions – in particular fear – shape New 
Right supporters’ views on religion and the cleavages surrounding religion, we con-
ducted group interviews amongst members of New Right parties and activist groups in 
Germany.  
3.1 Sample and Data  
We conducted group interviews (Frey & Fontana, 1991) because we were interested in 
(a) differences across political groups, (b) in the collective dimension of political emo-
tions, and (c) because we suspected that in individual interviews, respondents might 
too easily rely on discursive “streamlined” knowledge. We conducted interviews with 
natural groups, that is social groups that exist beyond the specific research context. 
Groups were sampled on a number of criteria likely to produce a broad range of dif-
ferent narratives. First, we included groups from East and West Germany since they 
imply distinct political socializations and significantly different levels of religiosity. 
Second, we included groups whose members predominantly recruit from both rural 
and urban areas, which are known to be linked to different political leanings and ex-
posure to immigrants. Third, we sampled on demography to include younger and older 
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respondents and different genders. Finally, we sampled different types of organiza-
tional backgrounds, in particular political parties and activist groups.  
The total sample included 24 individuals (2 female) in five groups, three of which 
were all-male, varying in size between four and ten individuals. Age (21 - 75 years) 
and socio-economic status varied considerably across as well as within groups. Three 
groups were recruited from members of local chapters of the “Alternative für Deutsch-
land” (AfD), a New Right party with notable electoral success in the past decade, pres-
ently being the largest opposition party in the German Parliament. One group consisted 
of members of a local chapter of the “Identitarian” movement, a youth movement that 
is active in many European countries and is described as being part of the global “alt-
right” (e.g., Virchow, 2015). The fourth group consisted of members of the German 
“Pegida” movement (see above) (Dostal, 2015). All interviews were conducted be-
tween November 2017 and March 2018, lasted approximately two hours, and were 
conducted at a time and place determined by the groups.  
We sought to instigate discussion within the groups to be structured by the partici-
pants and our main goal was to stimulate a self-sustaining debate (Przyborski & Wohl-
rab-Sahr, 2009, pp. 106f). Nevertheless, we prepared a brief interview guideline that 
started with a stimulus question and contained broad topics for checks and re-inquiries. 
All group interviews were fully transcribed and then analyzed.  
3.2 Analysis  
To analyze our data, we combined concepts from existing theory and research with the 
Documentary Method (Bohnsack, 2010). This approach proposes to distinguish be-
tween “what” has been said from “how” individuals produce their social reality collec-
tively through more latent and taken-for-granted knowledge. To reconstruct this latter 
“documentary meaning”, we focused on instances of notable “metaphorical” and “in-
teractive density” (ibid., pp. 102ff). In line with this, we conceive of our interviews as 
collective efforts of “front-stage” self-presentation and self-understanding that provide 
insights into unambiguous, taken-for-granted views as well as into the contested and 
debated perspectives. 
Based on the literature reviewed above, we used the following sensitizing concepts 
to guide our inductive analysis: We used the concept of boundary work to sensitize 
interpretations to narratives involving distinctions between “us” and “them” (Lamont 
& Molnar, 2002). Second, we paid attention to statements invoking religion, either as 
a substantial or functional category. Third, we paid close attention to instances directly 
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or indirectly referring to emotions. We looked for specific emotion words, prototypical 
emotional narratives (Kleres, 2011) and affective registers (Berg et al., 2019). Fourth, 
the prototypical narrative structure of fear proved a valuable guideline for our analysis. 
Fear is typically based on three patterns of perception: the salience of a particular good 
or value, for instance a person, object, or idea. Fear then results from the belief that 
this good is threatened and likely to be harmed and that this harm is largely beyond 
one’s control. 
4. Results: Fear of Islamization amongst the New Right 
When activists of the New Right talk about religion and cultural differences as im-
portant cleavages in contemporary societies, articulations of fear become evident along 
three major categories that emerged from our data: self and collective identity, Mus-
lims as a threat to valued goods, and loss of control.  
4.1 Collective identity: Antidote to existential insecurity 
References to a collective identity as a valued good are common across all groups we 
interviewed and they are intricately linked to articulations of fear. Interviewees fre-
quently refer to a collective “We” as an important social category when it comes to 
religion and other political cleavages. Although the specific semantics of this “We” 
differ across groups, they retain a “true people”-based connotation which entails polit-
ical and cultural references. 
Respondents describe this “We” as consisting of liberal as well as cultural and his-
torically anchored political subjects belonging to a national body. They consider them-
selves liberal in that they emphasize their status as citizens of the democratic and lib-
eral polity of the Federal Republic of Germany. The liberal outlook is, in this sense, 
defined by the description of corresponding political ideas such as the rule of law or 
democratic principles, but also by way of citizenship. This is illustrated, for example, 
by Armin1, a member of an East German chapter of the AfD. When their group dis-
cussed what it means “to be German”, he literally produced the German Constitutional 
Law (“Grundgesetz”) from his pocket, called it “our Bible” and read the paragraph 
regulating German citizenship, closing with the words: 
 
1   All names used are aliases.  
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Armin: And with this I own every discussion... if you now say: (...) ‘Well, that's what it says on 
paper, that's not worth anything, and I have other views.’ Well, then we are on different worlds. 
This here is the much-pictured German. Basta. Unity. 
The legitimacy and validity of the Constitutional Law seems undeniable for this 
respondent and defines a categorial rationale of belonging: those who hold German 
citizenship belong to the political community, those who act against or argue outside 
of its scope, do not belong, they are incompatible with the collective “We”. 
What also becomes apparent here is the materiality of the affective dimension of 
collective identity. The political community and its ideology are not just abstract ideas, 
but they can be touched and felt through the pages of a book. The materiality of the 
book thus lends credibility to liberal constitutionalism and delimitates the boundary of 
a legitimate debate on political belonging. 
Aside from the historically grown legal and liberal norms of political self-under-
standing, we find a range of cultural references in respondents’ self-conceptions that 
are deemed important conditions for political community. This is illustrated by two 
quotes from members of the “Identitarian Movement”: 
Nils: Identity is giving meaning to the meaningless. No, we are born, we are thrown into the world, 
and, no idea, that in itself is absurd. What helps is a kind of narrative, a narrative in which I can 
place myself. And identities are stories for me. I have the history of the German, whatever, European 
history, Christian history…It's a narrative in which I have the freedom to place myself. 
Denis: And when you say: national pride. That's what many people say.. (...) But I find that (...) falls 
a little bit short. Yeah, I'm referring to myself, and I'm putting some more effort into it.. (...). But, 
there you cannot necessarily talk of pride, but more of love of one's homeland or country, I think. 
These examples reflect the idea that the individual subject (“thrown into the world”) 
becomes aware that simply being in the world requires a meaningful narrative (“iden-
tity as narrative”) to make sense of this world. Interestingly, these are historically an-
chored narratives of the nation, of European heritage, and Christianity. Although this 
collective dimension is mostly embraced by our respondents, it is also looked at re-
flexively, further qualified by an element of choice and liberal thought, rooted in indi-
vidual traits and preferences, as becomes evident in “the freedom to place oneself”.  
Importantly, religious in conjunction with national identity become an antidote to 
existential insecurity. Being “thrown into the world” bears strong connotations of a 
lack of agency, uncertainty, and insecurity, and religious and national identities act as 
a remedy against these feelings. This also becomes evident in the reference to “love” 
(of one’s homeland), which trumps feelings of “pride” often mentioned in connection 
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with national identity. Research has repeatedly highlighted religion and national iden-
tity as belief systems marshaled against existential insecurities (e.g., Hammack, 2011, 
p. 122f).  
Taken together, narratives of voluntary choice, as embodied in references to Ger-
man Constitutional Law, and those emphasizing the lack of agency, such as those re-
ferring to a communitarian national heritage, are roughly balanced in the groups. More-
over, respondents frequently acknowledged the historical variation and emotional am-
bivalence of the social formations that provide collective identity, as this quote from a 
member of the “Identitarian Movement” illustrates:  
Denis: So, this is what we are always accused of: Yes, national pride. But that's much more complex 
with us, [...][...] it’s, so to speak, like an onion: You have the family, you have the local community, 
you have different regional dialects. For me there is no such thing as: this is a genuinely German 
culture, [the] Germans, for me there is no such thing. (...)Then of course there is the National, we 
definitely have our own history, the language, but also Europe. 
To summarize, collective identity and the collective “We” are constructed as a 
“loved” and valued good that acts as an antidote to existential insecurities, it is per-
ceived as an anchor to which respondents hold fast when reflecting about the social 
world. The collective “We” provides security in a world perceived as increasingly 
complex and uncertain. This “We” consists of categorical boundaries in terms of po-
litical-liberal and legal norms, primarily defined by citizenship and the Constitutional 
Law. The boundaries and fear-repelling attributes of the collective “We”, however, 
become more fuzzy when constructed with regard to cultural ideas and practices per-
taining to the nation, to Europe, or Christianity.  
4.2 Muslim immigrants as a threat: From cultural difference to power relations  
In addition to the valued collective “We”, a second major reference for fear are threats 
to specific domains of social life. In the interviews, we find that these threats emanate 
from the trope of the “foreign”, which is constructed as a danger to the collective “We” 
through a wide array of ascriptions. From these, we have singled out two basic dimen-
sions, “cultural difference” and “being outnumbered”, which are the building blocks 
of five domains of social life perceived as threatened, which we subsequently describe 
in this section. 
Cultural difference in our interviews typically implies an understanding of culture 
as primarily defined by religious beliefs and practices. Contrary to respondents’ de-
scriptions of the collective “We”, culture in this context is not considered fuzzy and 
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malleable, but rather a fixed quality of groups. In constructing cultural difference, in-
terviewees semantically homogenize their own group and the “other”:  the collective 
“We” now appears as a homogeneous, spatial and cultural entity which is challenged 
by immigrants. This challenge arises from the belief that immigrants are “carriers” of 
cultural practices that are not only different, but in fact incompatible to the autochtho-
nous culture.  
The belief in cultural differences and incompatibilities surfaced through various 
categories, but was ultimately represented in the image of Islam. Throughout the inter-
views, categories of alterity, nationality, and ethnicity emerged, as is evident in uses 
of words like “foreigners”, “migrants”, “Turks”, “Arabs”, and “Africans”. However, 
all these signifiers are used more or less synonymously for being “Muslim”. In addition, 
gender is a crucial category to exemplify differences between “us” and “them”. In a 
more general sense, these references and rhetorical strategies mirror contemporary 
neo-racist discourse, in which difference is mainly constructed along the category of 
“culture” (Balibar, 1991). 
The second key dimension, “being outnumbered”, is closely linked to cultural dif-
ferences and incompatibilities, but focuses more on assumptions about population dy-
namics and presumed changes in power relations. Cultural difference is widely con-
sidered problematic, but only tends to become a significant threat when combined with 
changes in the relations between the cultural majority and minorities. This reflects 
scholarship on multiculturalism arguing that many cleavages surrounding immigration 
are related to ideas and conceptions of minority-majority relations (Kylicka, 1995).  
These two dimensions are the building blocks of five key domains of social life 
that are considered to be under threat – and thus fear-inducing – by what respondents 
broadly describe as the process of “Islamization”: demography, the liberal democratic 
order, public majority culture, security, and welfare.  
Demography. In the interviews, the topic of “demographic change” combines ac-
counts of cultural difference and incompatibility with the idea of being outnumbered. 
Immigration and birth rate statistics are key to this imaginary. One notion of demo-
graphic change centers around (forced) migration and related policies. In this respect, 
increasing numbers of refugees since 2015 and the lively debates over immigration 
policies across Europe are key reference points for interviewees’ perceptions of 
changes in cultural minority-majority relations. In 2015, the number of asylum seekers 
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in Germany peaked at approximately 890.000 individuals2 and continued to be at ele-
vated levels until 2019. The interviewed groups unanimously describe this time as a 
period of “open borders”, “mass migration”, and “refugee waves” which are believed 
to lead to an overall shift in the power balance between cultural groups. Harald and 
Elisabeth, both members of Pegida, articulate these concerns, providing a good exam-
ple of how “Islam” becomes a signifier for complex population dynamics: 
Harald: And the other thing are the sheer masses, because of the opening of the borders, or the 
keeping open of the borders, one has to say, they had already been open before [the refugee crisis 
in 2015], and one just didn’t close them. According to the principle: We can’t do anything about it, 
what are we supposed to do? And that is the increase in Muslims here. And at some point, it will be 
the sheer masses. [...] Nobody claimed that Islamization is coming abruptly, overnight. It comes 
stepwise, through a shift in the power balance. And this is my fear.  
Elisabeth: It has been for years. Taking ever more room. 
A further perspective on changes to demography and power relations hinges on 
birth rates. In this narrative, gender relations become crucial. Across the interviewed 
groups, participants construct cultural difference along a line implying that “Muslim” 
women would show notably higher birth rates than autochthonous women, and that 
this will, in the long run, lead to a shift in minority-majority relations and a reversal of 
political power. This becomes evident in a quote from Denis and Nils, members of the 
“Identitarian Movement”:  
Denis: Well, we have about 80 million inhabitants. 70 (...) So about 60 million are now so genuinely 
German, and 20 million are just immigrants. We have a fertility rate of 0.2 for German women born 
between 1974 and 1992, while Muslim women have an average fertility rate of 3.1 for women born 
between that year and 1992. This means that this is already being tipped over in many large German 
cities - so in Frankfurt [am Main] I think this is already the case, so there are already over 50 percent 
migrants - and, if you look at the demographic change today, then we have a much higher mortality 
rate and we have even more immigration by refugees. So, and if we continue to calculate that, if it 
stays that way, and those are the nice figures now, then I think we will be from 2040, ... a little later 
perhaps, ... A little later perhaps, we are definitely a minority in our own country. And that will 
always go on like this. And the 0 to 15-year-olds, we've been the minority for a long time. 
Nils: Yes, uh [...] so in any case something will change. 
This dialogue illustrates the rhetorics of cultural homogenization present through-
out the interviews. It also points at contradictions in interviewees’ imaginations of 
identity. For example, Denis uses interchangeable references for the “other”: “Immi-
grants” become “Muslim women” which then turn into “refugees”. Whereas Denis in 
 
2    https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-
2015.html?nn=403964 
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a former quote opposes the idea of fixed identities, he here constructs difference by 
opposing categories of “genuinely German” with those of “immigrants”. A presumed 
higher reproductive activity among “Muslims” will, in the long run, reverse majority-
minority relations, making “Germans” a “minority in our own country”. 
These presumed population dynamics and changes in power relations are unani-
mously perceived as threats to the collective “We”. Fear in this regard can be further 
defined with respect the perceived coping potential. Whereas the topic of immigration 
is characterized by a critique of extant immigration policies and the principled possi-
bility to change these policies, the issue of birth rates and its implied population dy-
namics lack such a potential. Since fear hinges on perceived coping potential, the topic 
of demographic change and its connotation of powerlessness are likely to amplify 
many of the other threatened goods we discuss in the following.  
The liberal democratic order. The imagination of demographic change goes 
hand-in-hand with various specific threats to the collective “We”. One of these is the 
narrative about the political and legal order of the valued “We” that is under threat. 
Constructing this threat, respondents repeatedly essentialize Islam by arguing that its 
“ultimate interpretation” – as a member of the Southern chapter of the AfD put it – 
lacks any concept of secularism and the separation of religion and the state. Along the 
same lines, respondents quote Surahs from the Quran and construct theological hy-
potheses, for instance that the “separation between politics and religion never took 
place” because of the historical absence of “enlightenment in Muslim societies”. Also, 
respondents invoke the notion that the “Sharia” is supposed to be “incompatible with 
the German Constitutional Law”.  
Importantly, the notion of “being outnumbered” is essential in this narrative: All 
groups escalate this political conflict to an actual threat through the idea that, in the 
long run and through “demographic change”, Islam will overthrow the liberal demo-
cratic order to install an Islamic “Caliphate”. All groups argue that only a specific con-
cept or interpretation of Islam renders this scenario plausible. Accordingly, Muslims 
should submit to the prevailing liberal democratic order as long as they are a minority. 
Once they constitute a majority, however, they are obliged by divine law to establish 
an Islamic order. From this standpoint, respondents constantly deny Islam the status of 
a religion that is subject to change, but rather characterize it as a “political ideology” 
effectively thwarting integration and the amenability of Muslims to democracy. Fear 
of Islamization is thus not only rooted in the appraisal of cultural difference and a belief 
in changing power relations, but likewise specified by imaginations of the political 
incompatibility between Islam and the liberal democratic order.  
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Public majority culture. Islam is further seen as conflicting with what interview-
ees describe as the „German Leitkultur”3, the “German” way of life. It is important to 
note that even though this notion of threat refers to everyday practices, all groups qual-
ify the perceived incompatibility of “German” and “Muslim” practices by a distinction 
between the private and the public sphere. Referring to the principles of liberalism, 
respondents repeatedly affirmed that religious practices “are a private matter” and 
should not become an object of indignation as long as they remain compatible with 
legal norms. However, everyday “Muslim” practices become an issue once they extend 
to the public sphere and disrupt citizens’ presumed “peaceful” communal life. In this 
respect, Muslim practices are perceived as intentional acts of disregard and misrecog-
nition of the public.  
Interviewees frequently expressed secular sensibilities towards different aspects of 
Muslim practices that become visible in public. Gender, again, is a key reference in 
our interviews. Respondents argued that Islam promotes a “sexist culture” which is 
directly opposed to “German” gender norms, which in their essence are assumed to 
embody gender equality. Headscarves or “modest” clothing, for example, are seen as 
important indicators of these cultural differences. Likewise, mosques and minarets are 
perceived as a means for Muslims to show off their emerging cultural power.  
The notion of “being outnumbered” is an important part of these narratives of con-
flict over the public sphere. The interviewed groups see considerable changes in mi-
nority-majority power relations by referring to, for example, “parallel societies” in the 
city of Berlin where “one does not feel at home any more”. An example from an inter-
view with a West German chapter of the AfD illustrates how feelings of cultural alien-
ation and “becoming a minority” are expressed. Here, the threat stems from changing 
food practices in public schools:  
Gerhard: The problem starts when you start to affect society with your faith in such a way that you 
restrict the rights of others, and we have to see where Islam does that. (...) In our city, for example, 
there are no more pork dishes in the schools, except at the Protestant school. (...) Now you could 
(...) at least make [and offer] a pork meal, but you have to know that a kitchen, in Islamic teaching, 
is impure if even one pork meal is prepared there. (...) And that is why it must be so that everyone, 
including Christians or non-believers or whatever non-Muslims, all receive a pork-free diet. 
In sum, a culturally diverse public sphere, that is, a public sphere in which certain 
Muslim practices become visible or are accounted for, becomes appalling for our re-
spondents, posing a threat to their cultural sensibilities regarding gender, religion, or 
 
3     The German term „Leitkultur“ is frequently used in debates about immigration and means „dominant 
culture“, carrying both descriptive and deontic normative implications.  
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food. In other words, a culturally diverse “We” seems impossible to grasp and recog-
nize for our respondents because it lacks the capability to establish communal bonds 
and disintegrates the political community.  
Security. The interviewed groups also frequently articulated fears related to bodily 
well-being, both in individual and collective regard. Interviewees were quick to inter-
pret gender as a marker of cultural difference: In their view, a “sexist culture” and more 
specifically ideas of “masculinities” of male Muslim immigrants promote crime and 
Islamist terrorism. The notion of “being outnumbered” in this narrative is not only 
made salient by respondents referring to anecdotal evidence and personal experiences, 
but also by referring to what they describe as “official statistics”.  
Two strategies are most prevalent: the groups refer to crime statistics to either 
demonstrate a presumed increase in overall crime rates (especially since 2015) or to 
indicate higher (relative) crime rates amongst immigrants and refugees compared to 
the native population. This is illustrated by one member of the “Identitarian Move-
ment”: 
Chris: Of course, when you say something like that (...) you don't mean everyone. But there are 
certain trends in a particular collective that simply show something to that effect. Of course, not all 
refugees are rapists and murderers, terrorists, whatever. But it is astonishing that when such cases 
come to light, that they are very often refugees, that this group is simply disproportionately present 
among the perpetrators. And at some point, you can no longer deny that. This has nothing to do with 
hate or racism when you talk about facts. Facts can’t be racist! 
The belief that members of a specific social category are “disproportionately” rep-
resented amongst criminal offenders and terrorists renders them a particularly salient 
threat to individual and collective well-being. This is particularly true when respond-
ents establish links between Muslim immigrants and terrorism, since the very nature 
of terrorism is to induce fear (Bauman, 2006). Likewise, research on the securitization 
of asylum suggests that the characterization of immigrants and asylum seekers as 
threats to security is likely to induce fear (e.g., Hansson Malmlöf, 2016). 
 Welfare. Finally, respondents are also keen to articulate fears in relation to social 
and economic welfare. Members of the interviewed groups mutually confirmed their 
views that immigrants and asylum seekers are better provided for by the state in terms 
of social security than “the Germans” are. Immigrants and asylum seekers are supposed 
to “drain” and corroborate the welfare state or deprive the native population of jobs 
and resources. Gerd, a member of the West German AfD chapter, provides an example:  
Gerd: I believe that the social system that we have here could perhaps serve as an example to other 
parts of the world; if we allow too many people to enter this country, it will simply collapse and 
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then we will no longer be able to make the contribution that we are making today to support other 
countries, and if we no longer have the exemplary function that we could perhaps still offer. 
This quote shows how both cultural difference and group relations become essen-
tial for the threat narrative: Gerd imagines immigrants not as members of the workforce 
contributing to economic welfare, but considers them exclusively as beneficiaries of 
the welfare state.  
4.3 Threats from within and losing control  
The image of Islamization is finally bolstered by another fear-inducing pattern of 
meaning-making: the uncontrollability of the threat(s). Fear to a large extent rests on 
the appraisal that a threat cannot be averted or its consequences being coped with. 
Research on boundary work argues that the identification of the “other” always implies 
a specific self-characterization. Hence, while the interviewed groups draw cultural 
boundaries through political, religious, cultural, gender-related, and economic narra-
tives, they implicitly recount the “We” as being liberal, secular, democratic, economi-
cally productive, etc. However, besides these implicit positive self-references, mem-
bers of the interviewed groups also discussed a range of undesirable qualities of the 
collective “We”. We summarize these interpretations under the label threats from 
within.  
Islamization as an “external” force becomes unmanageable and irreversible in par-
ticular when constructing the collective “We” as a political and cultural minority. The 
“We” in these narratives becomes a “hollow” and “rotten” entity: the delusional and 
ignorant “welcoming and humanistic do-good culture”, which, because of its “lack of 
national pride,” is not willing to stop the “torrent” of Muslim immigrants. A member 
of the “Identitarian Movement” summarizes this criticism:  
Andreas: (...) About Islam [and the threat]... there is the [publicist] Stocker, (...) who has written: 
He sees the threat of the West not in the headscarf, but in the sweatpants. 
–all laugh – 
Andreas: And, hey, of course I [as a devout Catholic] have more intersections with a devout Muslim 
than with the, the selfish egoist uh, oh in Prenzlauer Berg [a bohemian Berlin district], if that’s 
where they live.  
–all laugh – 
Andreas: [Our] criticism of Islam, of course, refers first and foremost to what we have here at the 
moment, the negative consequences of Islam. 
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Although Islam is clearly imbued with negative attributes in our interviews, a sec-
ond important „threat to the West“ comes from within their own cultural community. 
“Sweatpants” in the above quote stands for many issues the groups complained about 
which amount to a perceived de-valuation of desirable virtues, rendering the collective 
“We” weak and vulnerable: Wearing “sweatpants” here is associated with a withdrawal 
from the public, with laziness, consumerism, hedonism, and unproductivity – put dif-
ferently: How can a “country” in sweatpants “serve as an example to other parts of the 
world?”, to quote the respondent in the above paragraph. In addition to the many de-
valuations, respondents also acknowledged a range of desirable traits among “Mus-
lims”, which they lament to lack in their collective “We”, such as national pride, family 
values, solidarity, and a strong group consciousness. From this perspective, the groups 
see themselves as a minority that still upholds traditions and pride vis-á-vis a majority 
that celebrates cultural diversity and at the same time disdains its own culture.  
The idea of losing control further gains momentum in a second regard: Although 
interviewees marshal a general criticism against their co-nationals, the weakening of 
the political community is at the same time attributed to a range of “elites”, as usually 
found in populist ideologies: Interviewees were quick to blame political parties, “main-
stream” media, and “cultural elites” for this lack of control. In this respect, the narrative 
of fear is closely linked to other emotions, such as anger and resentment. The groups 
accused these institutions and their social milieus for refraining from controlling any 
of the above-mentioned threats. Moreover, they accuse “elites” to strategically pro-
mote Islamization. Gender becomes an important category to express the perceived 
corroboration of the collective “We”, as the following quote of a member of Pegida 
indicates:  
Gunnar: And here, for a long time now, a policy has been pursued that has led, already led, to the 
fact that the people who create value do not multiply so much. By that I mean the destruction of 
families, (...) 
Heinz: Yes.  
Gunnar: (...) through gendering, through feminisation of men here as well.  
(Heinz laughs) 
Gunnar: It's a certain kind of development here. Softening of the men's world.  
In this quote, different fear-inducing patterns intersect: The birth rate of a valued 
in-group is deemed too low compared to other groups. Whereas this idea implies nar-
ratives about “cultural difference” and “being outnumbered”, Gunnar argues that this 
is intentionally so. The comparably lower birth rates of the in-group are a political 
strategy, steered by feminist policies and men who are “softened” or “feminized”. In 
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sum, our interviewees turn cultural differences pertaining to Muslims into unavoidable 
threats to the collective “We” and their majority status because no policies are in place 
that would prevent further immigration and declining birth rates of the in-group.  
5. Conclusion 
The recent success of New Right movements and parties across European Societies 
has spurred a range of research looking at the emotional underpinnings of this success. 
Most of this research has either looked at individual-level emotional determinants of 
electoral behavior and movement participation from a demand side perspective, or at 
emotions in New Right political discourse from a supply side perspective. What is 
lacking, in particular for the European context, is an understanding of how supporters 
and voters of the New Right experience and make sense of pertinent cleavages with 
regards to emotions. Using group interviews, we therefore investigated the emotional 
narratives and experiences of supporters of New Right parties and movements in Ger-
many, focusing on religion as a particularly prominent cleavage, and on fear as an 
emotion known to play a decisive role in demand- and supply-side explanations of 
New Right support.  
Based on research of the cognitive antecedents of fear, our analysis capitalized on 
valued goods, perceived threats to these goods, and assessments of one’s coping po-
tential. Our results show, first, that narratives involving fear frequently pertain to the 
idea of a valued collective “We” that consists of political and cultural elements and 
serves as a reference point to collective identity and an antidote to existential insecuri-
ties. The political elements of this “We” include ideas of liberal democracy and of the 
rule of law, whereas cultural elements refer to national heritage, Christianity, language, 
practices, and cultural traditions. The collective “We” is mostly imbued with positive 
emotions (e.g., love) and is widely perceived as an anchor of identity in a world per-
ceived as increasingly complex and uncertain. It consists of unambiguous categorical 
boundaries in terms of political-liberal and legal norms, which are primarily defined 
by citizenship and Constitutional Law. These boundaries become fuzzy when con-
structed with regard to cultural ideas and practices pertaining to the nation, to Europe, 
or Christianity.  
Second, our analysis shows that a further reference point of fear are threats to spe-
cific domains of social life deemed valuable. These threats are rooted in perceptions of 
cultural difference and the idea of being outnumbered by Others. Specifically, we find 
SFB 1171 Affective Societies – Working Paper 03/21 
 
19 
that the current demographic composition of society is suspected to change as a con-
sequence of immigration and purportedly higher birth rates amongst immigrants com-
pared to the native population. This contributes to the fear-inducing appraisal that the 
liberal democratic order is under pressure and possibly overthrown by a “Caliphate”. 
Being outnumbered by Others further threatens an ideal image of respondents’ beloved 
majority culture that is essential to the collective “We”, it pressures public security and 
social welfare, all of which are articulated as matters of concern.  
Although not every single enunciation frames Islam or Muslims as the responsible 
agents threating these valued goods, the patterns of interaction in our group discussions 
do suggest that “Muslim culture” is, in essence, incompatible with these goods. As-
cribed reproductive activity, orthodox religiosity, gender inequalities, violence, and 
economic unproductivity are typical traits circumscribing the anti-modern, which is 
why the narratives fit well within the discourse of Orientalism. However, we also found 
instances where these traits are appreciated, even envied, and seen as characteristics 
lacking in the collective “We”. This also becomes in our third finding, namely threats 
from within the collective “We” and the perceived loss of control concerning cultural 
diversity and population dynamics. Muslims become even more fear inducing threats 
when respondents self-categorize as a cultural minority within a multiculturalist ma-
jority that has given-up on traditional cultural virtues and instead engages in planned 
“Islamization”.  
Generally, it is striking that fear in the group discussions is notably rationalized. 
Contrary to wide held belief, our respondents hardly ever engage in affectively charged 
or strongly emotionalized discourse in terms of a particular populist style. Rather, fear 
follows a narrative structure. Respondents hold beliefs which are seen as impeding 
their aims, goals, and desires, coupled with the impression of a limited control potential, 
an almost textbook-like constellation of fear. Clearly, many of the beliefs the respond-
ents articulate are part of a racist discourse (Balibar 1991) and thus false by any stand-
ards or at least questionable. This, however, does not render fear any less tangible for 
the respondents.  
The present study thus contributes to a better understanding of the emotional un-
derpinnings of the success of the New Right. It supplements existing research, in par-
ticular from a demand-side perspective, that has hitherto capitalized on theoretical ar-
guments and survey research. Our study also suggests that political interventions aimed 
at offsetting illiberal, racist, and extremist tendencies on the New Right need to address 
and revise the belief structures underlying the various fears we described, rather than 
either pathologizing fears or exclusively focusing on emotional styles and rhetoric.  
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